



## **Socio-Economic Network of Cattle Business in the Animal Market of Lili - Camplong, Kupang Regency**

**Lasarus Jehamat<sup>1</sup>, Yosef Emanuel Jelahun<sup>2</sup>, Christine E. Meka<sup>3</sup>, Marianus Saldana Neno<sup>4</sup>, Felisianus E. Jelahun<sup>5</sup>**

Universitas Nusa Cendana, Indonesia<sup>1</sup>

Universitas Nusa Cendana, Indonesia<sup>2</sup>

Universitas Nusa Cendana, Indonesia<sup>3</sup>

Universitas Nusa Cendana, Indonesia<sup>4</sup>

Universitas Nusa Cendana, Indonesia<sup>5</sup>

lasarus.jehamat@staf.undana.ac.id<sup>1</sup>, yosef.jelahun@staf.undana.ac.id<sup>2</sup>, christine.e.meka@staf.undana.ac.id<sup>3</sup>, marianus.neno@stafundana.ac.id<sup>4</sup>, felisianus.efrem.jelahun@staf.undana.ac.id<sup>5</sup>

*Received: 26-07-2023*

*Reviewed: 27-07-2023*

*Accepted: 02-08-2023*

### **Abstract**

There are four fundamental goals for the people of East Nusa Tenggara in raising and developing cattle as a legacy from the Colonial. First, the cow is a sign of social status. The social status of the local community is not solely determined by how much money a family has, but more than that, social status is also determined by how many cows are kept in a large paddock. Secondly, the cow is an animal that supports the mating process. The cow is an animal that is a symbol of marriage for the people of NTT. Third, cows as animals that help the economy. Fourth, cattle are a commodity that is traded by local economic authorities who have extensive business networks. This descriptive qualitative research aims to examine the socio-economic networks among cattle farmers who come from the lower classes who also work as subsistence farmers, concerning cattle businessmen. As qualitative research, this study used three main methods to obtain field data. First, the in-depth interview was conducted with buyers, the local strong man Business Network, and the government of Kupang Regency. The second is the observation which was done in several villages in Kupang Regency and Camplong Market. Third, focus group discussion (FGD) was carried out on various related parties in the selling cycle involving local governments, businesses, cattle traders, and the community in general. The results of this study will be published in scientific journals and local media.

**Keywords:** Socio–Economic Network, Cattle Business, Animal Market, Lili Camplong, Kupang Regency

## **Introduction**

Business in the economic sector has been increasingly stretched in the province of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) in general and Timor in particular over the past three decades. One of the business fields developed is the cattle trade, both the sale of cattle in logs outside NTT and the business of cutting raw meat consumed at the local level.

NTT is considered a suitable location for the development of cattle projects. Four socio-geographical conditions make NTT province designated as one of the areas that deserve to be the location of livestock development. First, the area of NTT is mostly paddocks used to graze livestock in large numbers that are following the culture of the people of NTT. Second, the local culture makes the cow a supporter of social status. The more cattle are raised and owned by a person or tribe, the more their social status is considered to be respected among some local people. Third, cows as animals that serve as material and symbolic of *belis* or dowry for the people of NTT. Fourth, livestock is the basis of economic development for the community.

This is what makes the amount of cattle population in NTT quite high, even ranks the second largest population. Data katadata.com studies show that in 2020, the largest population was pigs with a total number reaching more than 2.5 million. Further, the second position is occupied by cows, which in 2020 reached a million more (<https://databoks.katadata.co.id/>).

According to (Penu, 2018), cattle are livestock that comes from two maintenance systems, namely the *Paron* system (75.21%) and the Shepherd system (24.79%). Cows that are kept with a grazing system are usually heavier than *Paron* cows. The main reason is that cows raised with a grazing system are more likely to find their food. However, all the cows entered the *Paron* system before being sold at the Lili market before being sold to other islands.

However, the potential of cattle in NTT in general, and Timor, in particular, is not enough to dismantle the level of welfare of farmers. General scale data shows that NTT province has occupied the third poorest position nationally over the past few years. This shows that although not the only one, the livestock sector (cattle) has not been enough to boost poverty in NTT.

One of the perspectives used in this study is the monopoly of socio-economic networks of local businesses that collaborate with national networks. It is this monopoly that keeps local farmers locked up in a network of highly competitive, exploitative, and even predatory businessmen (Hidayat et al., 2023). Data show that the cattle business involves a simultaneous national network of oligarchs. However, the problem is that the monopoly of this business network makes the cattle development project stalled, in addition to the political-economic interests of business people, also because of the huge losses suffered by local farmers. Using a critical perspective, this study seeks to look at the modus operandi of these networks from local to national, and how these networks impact the lives of farmers in Timor.

## **Literature Review**

Research on cattle breeding has been carried out by many people. Most scholars explain the technicalities in the livestock business to add to the accumulation of capital and a little for consumption.

Rurkinantia et al (2017) research in research seeks to identify several internal and external aspects as well as alternative strategies used in the cattle slaughtering business. The method used by Rurkinantia et al (2017) uses IFE and EFE matrices, SWOT matrices, and QSPM. With the choice of these methods, they found an increase in the quality of beef cuts by

## ***Socio-Economic Network of Cattle Business in the Animal Market of Lili - Camplong, Kupang Regency***

providing quality feed. In addition, to support the cattle slaughtering business, the priority strategy used is to reduce the interest rate on loans from banks.

In line with previous research, Fajrianto and Suprehatin (2020) also featured a cattle business. For them, the development of this business is carried out to meet the aspects of consumption at the national level. They use IFE, EFE, IE, and SWOT matrix methods. Their study found that the main internal aspect of the cattle business development business is the animal feed business, and external aspects are directly related to government policies and climatic conditions that greatly affect the condition of livestock. To support this aspect, for Fajrianto and Suprehatin (2020), creative collaboration with various actors is needed.

Furthermore, the results of research by Wamaer and Andri (2016) showed that the level of production and consumption of beef in Papua in general indirectly increased. This is evidenced by the availability of food from beef cattle. Although population numbers, slaughter, and availability of meat have increased, consumers do not show a spike in beef consumption on a typical day.

Concerning the process of buying and selling cattle, data from the Smeru Institute (2000) then showed interesting things. As mentioned, the model of buying and selling cattle by some farmers and ranchers in Kupang Regency was initially not like now. In the past, the model of buying and selling cattle was done by credit. Farmers who sell cattle to cattle traders usually do because they have taken money on credit from the trader. The money is used for various purposes. As a form of a bond, the merchant gives money and therefore the farmer or rancher will sell the cattle to the merchant (the creditor). In other words, in the past, buying and selling cattle was not carried out at the Lili-Camplong animal market. Cattle are sold in villages following the above pattern.

The research as shown above have a fundamental weakness that is ignoring the *modus operandi* of local socio-economic networks that collaborate with national networks. Therefore, this study seeks to fill a gap or gap that is rarely done by other scholars in Indonesia in general and East Nusa Tenggara in particular.

### **Research Method**

This study is qualitative descriptive research. In the social science tradition, qualitative research has a long history in the field of socio-humanities (Denzin and Lincoln, 2009). Qualitative research seeks to explore the deepest causes that move what appears on the surface. It is also understood as an attempt to solve the problems faced by humans (CF. Denzin and Lincoln, 2009). Qualitative research seeks to see the depth of an event as it appears on the surface.

The research location is in Camplong, Kupang Regency. The time span of the study will begin from early February to December 2023. As qualitative research, this method uses 3 methods to collect field data. First, an in-depth interview. The research team will interview a number of parties directly related to the business of selling cattle. Some of them are Kupang Regency cattle farmers, buyers, and actors who make Camplong market a trading arena, and local businessmen who have a National Livestock Market Network. Second, focus group discussions. The field data needed in this study need to be extracted from the FGD involving elements of local government through the Department of Animal Husbandry Kupang, district

government, and village government. In addition, FGD also involves cattle farmers and buyers as well as socio-economic networks that control the marketing of cattle in Timor. Third, observation (observation). The research team will conduct direct observations at the research site, either at the location of livestock farmers who also work as proletarian farmers or observations at the Camplong market the largest market in Timor. The field data (primary) were analyzed with theoretical perspectives taken from journals and books that are in accordance with the focus of this study.

## **Result/Findings**

### **RESULTS**

#### **1) Overview of Research Location**

Administratively, Sillu Village is included in the District of Fatuleu, Kupang Regency, East Nusa Tenggara province, and is one of the hilly villages with scattered Plains. Land with a slope of 40 percent reaches an area of 55% and plain land of 60 percent reaches 45 %. Such geomorphological conditions cause agriculture on the plains to be limited to both dry land and agriculture. Dryland farming is mostly done in areas with steep slopes so productivity is low. The territory of the village of Sillu is included in the suburban area of Kupang on the island of Timor. With the geological conditions in Sillu village, there are minerals C and adequate natural resources to be managed and protected.

The climate in Sillu Village is generally the same as in East Nusa Tenggara province, which is known for 2 (two) seasons: the dry and rainy seasons. In June-September the wind flow comes from Australia and does not contain much moisture so there is a dry season. In contrast, in December-March the wind currents contain a lot of water vapor from Asia and the Pacific Ocean, so the rainy season occurs.

This situation changes every half a year after passing through the transition period in April – May and October – November, although considering that East Nusa Tenggara is close to Australia, wind currents contain a lot of water vapor from Asia and the Pacific Ocean to the NTT region, the water vapor content has decreased which has resulted in rain in this region. This is what makes this village a relatively dry area where only 4 (four) months from January to March, and December which is relatively wet and the remaining 8 (eight) months are relatively dry.

**Table I. Types of livestock population in the village of Sillu**

<b>Types of Livestock</b>	<b>Number of Owners</b>	<b>Estimated Population</b>
Cow	112 people	300
Pig	140 people	280
Chicken village	197 people	1.182
Goat	17 people	51
Dogs	176 people	254
Cats	26 people	52
Broiler chickens		
Baby	2 people	11
Horse	3 people	7

Quail	
-------	--

Source: Processed Data of Sillu Village Profile in 2019

**Table II. Availability of forage fodder in Sillu Village**

Area of fodder crops (elephant grass, etc.)	131,7 ha
Production of forage fodder	5 Tons/ha

Source: Processed Data of Sillu Village Profile in 2019

**Table III. Marketing of livestock products in Sillu Village**

Sold directly to the consumer	No
Sold to the animal market	Yes
It is sold through the village union	No
It's sold by the brokers	Yes
Sold through resellers	Yes

Source: Processed Data of Sillu Village Profile in 2019

## 2) Characteristics of Informants

There were 8 people who became informants in this study

**Table IV. Characteristics of informants**

No	Name	Age	Occupations	Status
1	Lambertus Karel Tanu	36 years old	Trader / Cattleman	Local boss
2	Yacob Manggi	49 years old	Farmers / Ranchers	Farmers / Ranchers
3	Melanto Taosu	51 years old	Breeder / Farmer	Breeder / Farmer
4	Hangri Tinenti	27 years old	Breeder / Farmer	Breeder / Farmer
5	Rian Teme	18 years old	Cowman	Cowman
6	Notneno	59 years old	Farmers / Ranchers	Farmers / Ranchers
7	Marten Tanu	38 years old	Trader / Breeder	Trader / Breeder
8	Lodia Tanu	63 years old	Farmers / Ranchers	Farmers / Ranchers

### *3) Research Results*

Lili Camplong market has become a significant cattle trading center throughout East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). This market attracts attention from various regions, including North Central Timor, South Central Timor, Rote, Kupang Regency, and other regions. Originally, the Lili Camplong market was controlled or monopolized by the Camplong people, but now it has been switched or monopolized by the Amarasi people. Especially in Silu Village, the cows are usually taken from Oemofa Village and Silu Village itself, although more often taken from Oemofa Village. Previously, the collection of cows was carried out regularly every week, but now the frequency has decreased as the number of cows has begun to decrease. Previously, cows were very abundant, and even small-cap buyers had difficulty getting enough money to buy them. However, the situation has changed. Now, the local bosses have more money than the number of cows available. This happens because productive cows, especially female cows, are bought and sent to slaughterhouses in Kupang to meet the meat needs in the province. Meanwhile, large bulls were sent out of town. It is the government that buys heifers and carries out slaughtering in animal slaughterhouses.

In the Lili Camplong market, there are many cattle bosses who actively participate. However, when it comes to market dominance and monopoly, Amarasi people dominate that market share. They have the power to control all kinds of cows, both large and small. The Amarasi people came to the Lili Camplong market and bought all the cows that were there. If there are unsold cows, they then sell them in the Baun market. Sometimes, they also buy small cows and provide additional food for fattening. When talking about fattening cows, Amarasi people are considered more expert compared to cattle farmers in Kupang Regency. This dominance can have a complex impact. Although it provides benefits to the Amarasi people, it can also lead to market inequality and the occurrence of monopolies that harm other cattle farming communities.

At the Lili market, the local bosses of the Amarasi people have control over the pricing of cattle, which impacts the Fatuleu community. The Amarasi people can rule over the Fatuleu people because they have a large capital. LKT once tried to get the Fatuleu children to compete in the market, but it didn't work because the Amarasi people had more capital. The way they master the market is by becoming traders at every level, from the older generation to their children. Thus, they jointly dominate the market by buying all the cows from the ranchers and small bosses in each village and district. This resulted in them setting a very high selling price when they re-sold the cows to us. Their buying system involves the massive taking of cattle, both small cattle and large cattle. Today, the cows sent out of the city come from the Amarasi people. Delivery of these cows is usually done to Kalimantan and Surabaya because they have a connection with the big bosses there.

This situation shows the strong dominance of the Amarasi people in the Lili cattle market. The financial strength and business networks possessed by them provide a significant competitive advantage. The Fatuleu people and other small cattle ranchers in the area feel marginalized and find it difficult to compete with the capital and influence held by the Amarasi people.

In society, when someone wants to sell a cow, they have to go through a merchant because the existing pricing system is very unfair. Especially for new people who want to

## ***Socio-Economic Network of Cattle Business in the Animal Market of Lili - Camplong, Kupang Regency***

sell cows, the buyers, traders, and bosses play around with the price and easily lower the price of our cows. This makes people lazy to go to the market. For example, from first-hand to second-hand, the price of cattle is already different, and then traders who know each other work together to determine the price they want. As a result, if any person without experience in selling cattle came, he had no chance of making a profit and could not hope to get a higher price.

When the Amarasi people took control of the market, many people chose to sell their cattle to the local boss in each village because it was more profitable. This is due to the already-established relationship between traders in the market. For example, if a trader in the market sees that there are new people who want to sell cattle, the boss's men will come with the capital that has been given to make an offer at a lower price than the seller's prediction. For example, if the seller's predicted price is 8 million, the merchant will come and bid at 7 million. If the seller keeps the price of 8 million, the merchant will leave and the men from another boss will come and bargain for 5 million, and so on. This made it difficult for the sellers to sell their cattle, but in the end, they were forced to sell due to the pressure of necessity. Unfortunately, they will sell the cows at a lower price than expected.

This makes people not willing to sell cows directly in the market. It is better for them to sell cows to local bosses in the hometown because they will not lose on transportation costs. Now, transportation costs reach 100 thousand IDR. So, when a merchant or a small boss makes an offer to the community, the cow will be sold even though it makes the community feel disappointed. When we try to maintain the price, the boss will reduce the price drastically. After buying cows from the community, the boss then sells them at a much higher price. This situation shows the injustice in the cattle trading system in the market. The community of cattle traders and small farmers feel trapped in this circle, where they find it difficult to get a fair price for their livestock.

It is different if the local boss sells, because he already has customers, so he cannot play around with prices in the market, because in the market the big bosses almost always work together. Although there are Camplong natives who come to the market, they can also be deceived. In fact, they are natives of Camplong, but because they rarely go to the market, they can be manipulated. For example, there are Camplong Indigenous people who come to buy cows for the purpose of fattening the cows. They were offered a cow with a real price of only 4 million IDR but were given a price of 7 million IDR on the grounds that they wanted to keep the cow. In the negotiations, they bargained for a price of 6 million rupiah, when in fact the cow was only bought for 4 million IDR.

The chain of market monopolies causes local bosses to play a role in helping many communities to sell their cows, but the community is still at a disadvantage, because there is more value taken from each sales team. Usually, the bosses buy cows first and then will be replaced with money from the sale after the cows are sold in the market. However, if he is unable to survive in the market, he must transfer the cow to another party because the Amarasi people have high solidarity and are divided into cattle-buying groups. For example, for small cows from half to one year old, there is one person who is the chairman in organizing the purchase. Their task is to buy all the cows according to the existing distribution of duties. Similarly, with the big cows in Camplong, there are about 6-7 people

who manage it. As explained by the intermediate boss with the initials MRS that those who want to participate in the market must have sufficient experience. When they see someone new, they start putting price pressure on them.

Basically, people are very frustrated with the price dynamics and profits of local bosses and big bosses in the market. Society considers that bosses have an advantage in terms of the price and profit they get. Traders have unity and the ability to play prices, while ranchers feel trapped in a situation where they have to fight hard for a limited income. This means that even if the people who are struggling to maintain and expend a lot of energy do not have the power to regulate the price of their own cattle, on the contrary, those who regulate the price are their bosses who have money.

Based on the explanation from the informant that when someone raises cows, it is important not to cut certain parts of the cow's ear as an identification mark, but a stamp can be used as an alternative. This is to prevent the fall in the selling price of cattle. Sometimes, we can also choose not to use a stamp, but simply put a certain mark on the cows and feed them at home. However, for farmers who leave their livestock in the garden, they need to cut a small area on the cow's ear as an identification mark. Although this can affect the economic aspect, as it involves a reduction in the sale value, there are also other risks that must be considered. For example, when you want to sell cows independently and deliver them to the market, there is a risk that the cow will break its leg during distribution, which will ultimately reduce the selling value of the cow. The decision to use an identification mark such as a cut on the ear or use a stamp is a strategic decision for risk management.

Any government program only provides profit for the traders. For example, people who work in the Department and have a job in the district offices of animal husbandry. When there is a demand for seeds or funds used by the community, they will buy cattle at a price far from the farm and get a price in the market. In fact, if there is government funding, there should be a standard price that applies. However, only traders understand that there is such a project, while community cattle breeders do not understand it.

For example, in the budget plan (RAB) of Rp7, 500, 000, they will look for cattle from livestock at a price of Rp5, 000, 000 only. The rest will go into their pockets. Then, the official employee will go down to the boss in the market and ask the price of a high cow, for example, 110 million IDR, then they will think about how much it costs, and will provide information that the price is Rp7. 500,000 or Rp8, 000, 000. Moreover, they bought cows at a price of Rp5, 000, 000 from the community. So, they consider that high prices are the responsibility of the office manager. This indicates a connection between them. There are also service members who get such projects, in cooperation with the Livestock Service. For example, they bought a profit of Rp200, 000, 000, but service members only Rp25, 000, 000. They already have an idea of when RAB was founded, so they know exactly how to understand their goals. In this case, the disadvantage is public, since the government that should be their spy loses and is not serious in the face. However, the government cannot act alone because it has made decisions with them. Thus, this condition can be said to be stuck between a rock and a hard place.

Amarasi people who control the market also benefit because they have a small-scale market in Amarasi. If the sale of cattle in the Camplong market is not successful, they can still sell them in their own market. As for local traders, they are very vulnerable to going out



## ***Socio-Economic Network of Cattle Business in the Animal Market of Lili - Camplong, Kupang Regency***

of business if they miscalculate, manage money, or read the situation inappropriately. Some even have to sell houses and land for capital because they want to survive in market competition.

In addition to having a large capital, in the cattle delivery business in the Lili market, engaging in a practical political approach is also very important. There is a link between the owners of large capital and political influence. Therefore, those who have influence can regulate the price of cattle in the market. If they are not present, the cattle sellers in the market will have no buyers or find it difficult to sell their cattle. In the case of determining the price, they have the right to increase or decrease the price as they want. Entrepreneurs must also pay attention to political factors. In other words, the situation approaches the election, and as entrepreneurs, we need to be near the winning party in the election. That way, projects will be able to be obtained through collaboration with elected governments. The government itself has limited funds, while it is the merchants who have the financial resources. The government can only issue rules but does not have sufficient funding sources. Therefore, the processing of cattle delivery permits will go more smoothly when we have political support. On the other hand, it will be difficult to achieve such legalization if there is no political support.

It would be more accurate to state that because they must spend a lot of money on campaigns, dealers confront difficulties during the election season for legislative candidates. As a result, the government depends on and expects business owners. For instance, some people work in the district-level livestock service in Amarasi. These people typically take and purchase any cattle seeds or money utilized to empower the community. The average cost budget (RAB) of cattle, according to those who set the market price, is 7.5 million IDR per head, but they look for it at a price of 5 million IDR. In any case, they are the ones who set the price, so society has to adjust. Otherwise, people will suffer losses and get negative results. Therefore, price fluctuations occur in the Lily market at all times, especially on the eve of Easter celebrations some time ago.

### **Discussion**

To make it easier to understand market monopolies, researchers analyzed using the theory of asset Control and Karl Marx's political economy. Karl Marx a philosopher and economist of the 19th century, put forward a theory about the control of assets known as the theory of class conflict. Marx argued that the control of assets is centralized in the capitalist class that controls the means of production. He argued that the labor group or proletariat is enslaved by the owners of capital, which causes social and economic inequality in society. Marx argued that capitalist society is divided into two main classes, the owners of capital, or the bourgeoisie, and the workers, or the proletariat. The owners of capital are those who have access and control over the means of production, such as factories, land, and machinery, while workers are those who sell their labor to the owners of capital to make ends meet.

On the issue of the Lili Camplong market, that the Lili Camplong market is controlled by Amarasi people, in market relations there is a class division, between the bourgeoisie who have large capital (Amarasi people) such as; Bos Beni Masneno, Bos Son Bano, Mesak, David Ruku, Jeni and Bos Son. They are the owners of large capital who have access to monopolize the

market, determine the price of cattle and regulate the fate of cattle farmers who are classified as a working class who do not have access more like the big bourgeoisie of Amarasi. In this context, a monopoly occurs when a single entity or individual has complete control over the supply and price of a product or service in the market so that there are no significant competitors. In this case, the Amarasi people controlled the cattle market, meaning that he was the only major seller of cattle in the region and could influence the price as well as the available stock of cattle.

This class inequality makes cattle farmers forced to sell their cows to capital owners in order to obtain wages that are not in accordance with the results of the energy expended, time, and cost to raise cattle. While the bourgeoisie only with capital, without spending effort, time, and cost to raise cattle or in Marx's explanation is not involved in production work but produces profits that multiply. This is a form of injustice that continues to exacerbate inequality and there is no economic improvement of the working class.

Marx argued that the capitalist economic system creates social and economic injustice because the owners of capital take advantage of the labor of workers by paying relatively low wages and taking greater profits. As explained by an informant that the bourgeoisie who control the market if they do not come to the market, the cattle brought by farmers will not be bought or not sold. As a result, these bourgeoisie can play with prices as they please, either increasing or decreasing prices.

The condition of the farmers is enslaved to the dominance of money and power, thus creating exploitation of the farmers, the farmers are squeezed their labor, while generating surplus value that is taken by the owners of capital as a profit. Marx called it a "surplus value" that reflects exploitation in the capitalist system. Marx also criticized the existence of alienation in capitalist society. He stated that in capitalism, workers are employed by the owners of capital to produce goods that belong to the capitalist. In the process of production, workers lose control over the products of their labor and feel alienated from the results of their labor. As a result, farmers lost control of their own livestock prices.

The social and economic inequality generated by the control of assets in the Lili Camplong market causes opposition and conflict between the capitalist class and the proletariat, even the opposition between the big bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie in this case par abos-local bosses who depend on the Big Boss.

The condition of farmers who continue to be sucked into the circle of system capital that enslaves the condition of society is not taken seriously by the government by intervening in the Lili Camplong market so that farmers get certainty that price standards are not set by the bourgeoisie. This is in harmony with Marx's concept of the state, that of the state as an instrument used by the ruling class, that is, the capitalist class, to maintain power and maintain a social structure favorable to them.

According to Marx, the state is a reflection of class opposition in capitalist society. He argued that the state served as a repressive tool used by the bourgeois class to oppress the proletariat and maintain their dominance. Marx stated that the state is not a neutral institution standing above society, but rather a political instrument used by the ruling class to protect their interests and power. This is as explained that the bourgeoisie in the Lili market in taking more value from farmers also cooperates with the government and always takes the opportunity in every election constellation to get the power of power that can facilitate the process of licensing

## ***Socio-Economic Network of Cattle Business in the Animal Market of Lili - Camplong, Kupang Regency***

the bourgeoisie to be able to trade outside the region by issuing permits and quickly getting projects for the accumulation of capital in large quantities and quickly.

This condition makes it clear that in Marx's political economy that the structure of the economy or the material base of society determines the character of the superstructure, which includes political, legal, religious, and cultural institutions. In this case, the state is considered part of a superstructure that reflects the interests of the capitalist class. So, the interests of farmers to be able to get the attention of the government to be able to determine the market price and destroy the market monopoly is very difficult to do. As explained by the informant that the government does not have capital or money, the owners are businessmen or the bourgeoisie, so they are the ones who determine the government in taking policies, because the bourgeoisie has great interests, the government will not issue policies that harm and cut the profits of the bourgeoisie, because if it happens there will be class suicide. So that the role of the government in the Lili Camplong market is to maintain the stability of an unhealthy market and a tendency to exploitation so that profits on a handful of people are maintained so that the state is born as a tool of the ruling class.

In addition to getting exploitation by the big bourgeoisie, cattle farmers also get double oppression from the petty bourgeoisie or local bosses who play the role of taking cows in every village that will later be sold to the Big Boss in the market, so that the exploitation is done to the community many times over. This chain of connection requires that there is a new class that utilizes the limitations of society in this case such as cattle transport vehicles to take advantage. The small bosses to be able to survive also rely on the Big Boss, it can be concluded that the profit from the sale of cattle is a loss count for the small and big bosses, it is caused there is always a profit taken and there is always a loss count in every price offer and profit on the sale of one cow, for example, 1 cow is valued at 8 million IDR, then the small boss will buy with 7.5 million IDR, the rest of the 500,000. 00 IDR is the calculation of cows that have accidents such as broken legs, reasons for weight, height, and transportation, in fact, there is a profit of more than IDR 500,000.00 - IDR 700,000. 00 because of the calculation deduction, not to mention the big bosses who will calculate when shipping out of the province, that there will be depreciation so that cows sold from local bosses at a price of IDR 8 million can be purchased at IDR 7.7 million so that there continues to be a profit from each sale and the accumulation of capital is getting faster with the purchase of large numbers of cows, say hundreds, even the difference in price can be up to millions for the profit of a cow.

This causes no change or improvement in the fate of cattle farmers, and cattle farmers continue to live in a chain of exploitation and are not free from exploitation, deprivation of surplus value, and domination from the ruling class. While the conditions of the petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie continue to improve, the more advanced they become than the farmers, the more they continue to grow rapidly without engaging in productive work.

## **Conclusion**

Based on the above data and discussion, it was found that the network of traders in the Lili Camplong market was monopolized by the Amarasi people. Amarasi people rule over the aspect of capital availability. There, Amarasi people determine the rise and fall of prices and

play an important role in every project of the government. In practice, Amarasi traders run a very good relationship with the local government to monopolize the cattle trade. It is aimed at gaining legitimacy of power. As a result, the ranchers were in a precarious position.

The domination gave rise to small bosses from each village with little capital, whose role was to take advantage every time they took cattle from the community to be sold to the Lili Camplong market. Furthermore, the position of the Big Boss is difficult to replace. What happens is that the Big Boss destroys or kills the small boss or is it a new businessman who wants to run the same business? This condition occurs because the government does not have serious concerns with economic relations in the Lili Camplong market. There, the government does not have price standards to eliminate the dominance of the ruling class. In addition, the government does not have scales for farmers to determine the weight of cattle that have an impact on the price. Therefore, local governments must issue local regulations (Perda) or special rules relating to the pricing of cattle based on the type of sex, weight, and scales for the community. This is to ensure market equilibrium. In addition, the government could stop many unnecessary illegal fees on the Lili market.

## References

- Corbetta, Piergiorgio. (2003). *Social Research: Theories, Methods and Techniques*. London: Sage Publication.
- Databox Word Data. (February 2023). *Pigs are the leading livestock in NTT in 2020*. Retrieved from <https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2021/11/03/babi-jadi-ternak-unggulandi-ntt-pada-2020>.
- Denzin, Norman K, and Yvonna S Lincoln. (2009). *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Yogyakarta: Student Libraries.
- Fajrianto, Ilham Dzikri and Suprehatin Suprehatin. (2020). Broiler Cattle Business Development Strategy for the Berkah Usaha Group in Blora. *Agribusiness Forum*. (Vol. 10, No. 1).
- Hidayat, T., Madris, M., & Anwar, A. I. (2023). Influence of Population, Unemployment, and Poverty on Economic Growth in South Sulawesi Province. *Pancasila International Journal of Applied Social Science*, 1(01 SE-Articles), 68–79. <https://doi.org/10.59653/pancasila.v1i01.134>
- Rurkinantia et al (2017). Cattle Slaughtering Business Development Strategy. *Business and Management Applications*. (Vol. 3, No. 3).
- SMERU. (2000). *Rural Credit in Kupang Regency, East Nusa Tenggara*. (Special Reports). Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit (SMERU). Jakarta.
- Wamaer, Demas and Andri, Kuntoro Boga. (2016). Overview of Beef Production and Consumption in the Special Autonomy Era in Papua Province. *Journal of LPPM in the Field of Economy, Social, Culture, and Law* (May Edition Vol. 3 No. 1).